Lost Chances in Sino-American Relations: The Burden of Myth, Culture, and Ideology, 1949-1953 by Haga, Kai Yin Allison
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1997 
Lost Chances in Sino-American Relations: The Burden of Myth, 
Culture, and Ideology, 1949-1953 
Kai Yin Allison Haga 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Asian History Commons, International Relations Commons, and the United States History 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Haga, Kai Yin Allison, "Lost Chances in Sino-American Relations: The Burden of Myth, Culture, and 
Ideology, 1949-1953" (1997). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539626088. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-av5r-9z44 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
LOST CHANCES IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: 
THE BURDEN OF MYTH, CULTURE, AND IDEOLOGY
1949-1953
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Program in American Studies 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Kai-yin Allison Li 
1997
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Approved, April 1997
Edward P. Crjpol
Robert
Clyde Haulman
DEDICATION
This study is dedicated to the Fulbright Exchange Program, for its full 
financial support which helped the completion of this research.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v
ABSTRACT vi
INTRODUCTION 2
CHAPTER I. THE CHINA MYTH 5
CHAPTER II, THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION 15
CHAPTER IE. INTERNAL PRESSURES AND EXTERNAL
CHALLENGES 41
CONCLUSION 66
BIBLIOGRAPHY 70
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This writer wishes to express her sincere gratitude to her thesis advisor, 
Professor Edward P. Crapol, for his great encouragement, patient guidance and 
constructive criticism during her research on this paper. The author is also 
greatly indebted to Professor Robert Gross for his constructive criticism and 
Professor Clyde Haulman for his careful reading and invaluable comments on the 
manuscript.
Great appreciation is also extended to the author’s classmate James Spady 
for his skillful comments on the style and language of her next-to-last draft. The 
author also wishes to express her heartfelt thanks to her fellow sisters in Christ, 
Elizabeth Kuser and Lucy Funk, for their proof reading of the first rough draft, 
and to her parents and sisters for their unconditional love and support.
The author is also indebted to Dr. H. Schmidt, Dr. Priscilla Roberts, and 
Dr. Stacilee Ford, at the University of Hong Kong, for their recommendations to 
the Fulbright Exchange Program.
v
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this work is to show how American culture, ideology, 
experience, and politics influenced the formation of President Harry Truman’s 
Non-Recognition policy towards Communist China from 1949 to 1953.
Its thesis is that foreign policy, which is shaped by ideology, culture and 
experience, is the extension of domestic affairs in both acting and reacting to 
external changes and challenges. Misperception and misunderstanding, caused by 
different cultural beliefs, inadequate information, and underlying ideological 
differences, were the main causes of the hostile relations between the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and the United States.
Chapter I examines the formation and the influence of the China myth and 
the American disillusionment over the Communist victory in China. Chapter II 
narrates the chain of events from 1949 to early 1950 that affected Sino-American 
relations. It also explains the causes of Anglo-American differences. Chapter III 
describes the internal and external factors preventing United States recognition of 
the Communist regime in China.
The conclusion of this study is that the China myth played a significant 
role in shaping America’s perception about the rise of Communist China. The 
myth also aided the rise of McCarthyism and ensured the success of the China 
Lobby and China Bloc in the United States. These domestic political pressures 
kept the Truman administration from recognizing the PRC.
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LOST CHANCES IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: 
THE BURDEN OF MYTH, CULTURE, AND IDEOLOGY
1949-1950
INTRODUCTION
When the United States and Britain faced the problem of whether to 
recognize the newly formed communist government in China in October, 1949, 
these two close allies acted differently. The British government favored 
extending recognition to the new Chinese Government, but the United States 
government refused to do so. Why?
This essay analyzes the influence of American culture, ideology, 
experience, and politics on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy towards 
Communist China from 1949 to 1953. Its thesis is that foreign policy, which is 
shaped by ideology, culture and experience, is the extension of domestic affairs in 
both acting and reacting to external changes and challenges. Misperception and 
misunderstanding, caused by different cultural beliefs, inadequate information, 
and underlying ideological differences, were the main causes of the hostile 
relations between Communist China and the United States. Their confrontation 
reflected the clash of divergent cultures and national interests. Although many 
historians blame the Chinese Communists’ hostile actions for causing the tensions 
in early Sino-American relations, Americans have no way to escape their own 
responsibility.
2
3The formation of Harry S. Truman’s policy of non-recognition is the focus 
of analysis.1 The Non-Recognition policy initially was not within President 
Truman’s long-term China policy agenda and was debated again and again 
between 1949 and 1950 within the administration. After China entered the 
Korean War in November 1950, the Non-Recognition policy was fixed and 
became almost commandment left for Truman’s successors in dealing with 
Communist China. The United States not only refused to recognize the Beijing 
government, but also tried to prevent other western countries from doing so.
The Non-Recognition policy indeed survived for about thirty years, from
1949 to 1979, longer than the time it took the the United States to recognize the 
Soviet Union.2 Moreover, since not recognizing China was the first step of the 
Containment and Isolation Strategy,3 analyzing the formation of the Non- 
Recognition policy can help to discover the underlying causes of the long period 
of Sino-American hostility. This essay examines the gradual development of the 
Non-Recognition policy and analyzes what factors caused it to be fixed from
1950 onward.
1 Sino-American relations in this paper refer to the relations between the People’s Republic of China and the 
United States of America.
2 The United States refused to recognize the Bolsheviks in 1917. This policy continued until Franklin D. 
Roosevelt entered the White House in 1933. President Roosevelt decided to recognize the Soviet Union in 
November 1933.
3 The Containment and Isolation Strategy, formed by Truman after the Korea War broke out in June 1950, 
aimed at preventing the spread of communism in Asia by containing and isolating Communist China, similar 
to the case o f containing Soviet Union in Europe after the World War II. The Non-Recognition Policy was 
part o f the Containment and Isolation Strategy against China.
4There are three chapters in this essay. Chapter I examines the China myth 
and the American disillusionment over the Communist victory in China. Chapter 
II narrates the chain of events from 1949 to early 1950 that affected Sino- 
American relations. It also explains the causes of Anglo-American differences. 
Chapter III describes the internal and external factors preventing United States 
recognition of the Communist regime in China.
It is hoped that through these three chapters, readers will understand 
foreign policy is not simply a reaction to external change but an extension of 
domestic affairs. Most importantly, not only political, strategic, and economic 
factors, but also cultural and ideological factors, influence a country’s foreign 
policy. Within American Studies, foreign policy is an important way by which 
students may better understand American ideology, experience and culture and 
thereby help to explain how Americans respond to external changes and why 
Americans choose one policy out of many alternatives. The China myth 
demonstrated how American culture and experience distorted perception and 
understanding of external changes, and how what Americans experienced and 
thought affected policy makers.
CHAPTER I 
THE CHINA MYTH
The problem of recognition arose in early 1949 when the Nationalist 
Government, controlled by the Kuomintang (KMT), was about to be defeated by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The issue of whether the United States 
government should recognize the new Communist regime in Beijing occupied 
American foreign policy makers. The controversy was intensified by the work of 
the China Lobby, a strong lobbying group formed during the war with Japan by 
Nationalist officials to press for more American aid to the Nationalist 
Government. In addition, the competition between the two political parties, 
Democratic and Republican, exacerbated the controversy. Although the power to 
make foreign policy lies in the executive branch of government, the President and 
the State Department, the Constitution provides Congress the power to exert 
influence on foreign policy through its “advice and consent” and its role in 
ratification of treaties. It is through the elected Congress that the China Lobby 
and political party differences worked in combination with American culture and 
a distinctive ideology to affect American interpretation of and policy toward 
changes in China.
As Charles B. Marshall, a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the 
State Department, pointed out on March 17,1952:
Ends are concepts. Means are facts. Making foreign policy consists o f meshing
5
6concepts and facts in the field o f action. ... To me the phrase “national interest” 
does not mean a set o f aims arrived at without regard to value. I could not think of 
our foreign policy except in relation to the character o f the Nation and its political 
institutions. That has a bearing on the choice o f means in the conduct o f foreign 
policy.1
There are many ways to react to external changes. According to Marshall, 
national character, value, experience and political institutions were major factors 
affecting the conduct of American foreign policy. In other words, ideals such as 
freedom, democracy, liberty, capitalism, American exceptionalism, manifest 
destiny, materialism, and anti-intellectualism influenced American foreign policy 
making. These ideals, to a great extent, were the causes of the China myth, which 
was the erroneous perception of China held by many Americans. This myth 
distorted the way Americans interpreted radical changes within China in the late 
1940s. According to Robert Jervis, a leading scholar in international relations, 
misunderstanding and misperception were failures of communication “largely 
caused by unrecognized differences in evoked sets (immediate concerns) created 
by different geographical perspectives, time lags, and contrasting experiences.”2 
The American people’s culture, values, experience and ideology were the main 
causes of their misperception and misunderstanding of the success of the CCP.3
America regarded itself as a special friend of China. According to 
historian Michael H. Hunt, “the concept of a special relationship [between China
1 George C. Marshall, “The Nature of Foreign Policy,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXVI, No.661 
(March 17, 1952), p.416.
2 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1976), p.207.
7and America] ... had become a staple of both popular and official rhetoric, [that 
persisted into the] mid-[twentieth] century and beyond.”4 Americans believed 
that they were exceptional because unlike European imperialists, who had great 
political and territorial ambitions in China, they had no such ambition. They 
simply wanted to share their spiritual and material blessings with the Chinese 
people by sending merchants, ships, and missionaries to China.5 They believed 
that their non-aggressive policy aims were demonstrated by the Open Door Notes 
in 1899 and 1900.6 They further viewed the Washington Conference in 1920 as 
the greatest achievement in upholding China’s territorial and administrative 
integrity by persuading Japan to return the province of Shandong to China. 
Moreover, America supported China to be one of the permanent members, with 
veto power, in the United Nations Security Council. The United States 
government also gave tremendous economic and military aid to Chiang Kai- 
shek’s Nationalist Government for the war against Japan and recovery afterwards. 
According to the State Department’s estimation, in the previous thirteen years 
(from 1937 to 1950) the United States had sent aid to China at a rate greater than
3 See Huo Shiliang, “American Idealism and East Asia,” American Studies. (Published by the Chinese 
Association for American Studies and the Institute of American Studies Chinese Academy of Social Science) 
Vol.6, No.2 1992, p.36.
4 Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.299.
5 See Huo, “American Idealism and East Asia,” pp.38-39. Huo points out that based on the idea of Manifest 
Destiny and Christian mission, American people believed that they were having a ‘American (democratic) 
experiment5 that other countries should follow their example.
6 The First Open Door Note was sent by John Hay, the secretary of state, on September 6, 1899, to Japan, 
Germany, Russia, Britain, France, and Italy, asking them to maintain the territorial and administrative 
integrity of China. The Second Open Door Note was sent by Secretary Hay on July 3, 1900 when the Boxer 
Uprising broke out, asking the powers to preserve China’s territorial and administrative entity.
8100 million dollars a year, not including lend-lease and military aid. For 
example, in 1948, the United States Congress had approved 275 million dollars of 
economic aid and 125 million dollars of special grants to Chiang’s Nationalist 
Government.8 No other country or people in the world had done more for the 
well-being of the Chinese people than America. Historian Michael H. Hunt has 
concluded that:
Through times o f trial in China brought on by renewed foreign aggression or 
internal unrest, Americans held to the reassuring myth o f a golden age of 
friendship engendered by altruistic American aid and rewarded by ample Chinese 
gratitude.9
Due to the previous hundred years of sympathy and charity toward the Chinese, 
Americans strongly believed that they were a “special” friend of China.
The majority of Chinese, however, did not cherish the belief of a special 
friendship. Many Chinese regarded Americans as western imperialists who came 
to China to destroy their empire and their Confucian civilization. Chinese viewed 
their country as the “Middle Kingdom” — the center of the world — and believed 
that they were culturally superior to all races. Nearly all of the countries 
surrounding China were its tributary states. Thus, it was in the foreigners’ best 
interest to establish relations with China, but not in the best interest of the 
Chinese. Although the unequal treaty system broke China’s isolation and closed 
door policy, the attitude of most Chinese people did not change much. The
7 Statement by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, “U.S. Appeals to Chinese Communists To Stop Aggression 
in Korea,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, No. 598 (December 11, 1950), p. 932.
8 Statement by Dean Acheson, “American Policy Toward China,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIV, 
No.625 (June 18, 1951), p.972.
9 Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship, p.299.
9Chinese, in fact, blamed western encroachment as the main source of their 
political and economic calamities. Although Americans were not particularly 
aggressive in comparison with the English, the German, the French and the 
Japanese, the Chinese did not differentiate between Westerners. They tended to 
regard all foreigners “as cut of the same cloth, and thus any image of 
[Westerners inevitably included the Americans.”10 During the Boxer Uprising 
(1898-1900), for example, American missionaries in China were the major target 
of attack with many of them being killed.
The Chinese Communists preached the ideas of anti-imperialism and 
nationalism, and promised that the Communist revolution would build a strong 
and independent “new” China. Therefore, when the CCP took power in China in 
1949, it stirred up these long-term anti-foreign feelings and directed people to 
attack and humiliate foreign officials, missionaries, and businessmen. Harassed 
Americans in China, consequently, burned with anger and frustration. They could 
not understand why the Chinese hated them so much. Thus, it was natural for the 
United States to conclude that all these confrontations were not due to Chinese 
hostility, but were of Russian origin instead.
As historian Stephen E. Ambrose has pointed out:
Americans high and low implicitly assumed that with good policies and enough 
will, the United States could control events anywhere. If things did go wrong . . . it 
could only happen because o f mistakes, not because there were areas o f the 
world in which what American did or wanted made little difference. The
10 Quoted by William L. Neumann, “Determinism, Destiny, and Myth in the American Image of China,” 
Issues and Conflicts: Studies in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy, ed. George L. Anderson. 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1959), p. 17.
10
assumption that in the end every situation was controllable and could be made to 
come out as the United States wished -- what Senator William Fulbright later 
called “the arrogance o f power” — colored almost all foreign-policy decisions in 
the early Cold War.11
This pride was clearly based on the idea of American exceptionalism. American
people regarded themselves more pure, innocent, and righteous than other people.
The success of the two World Wars “contributed to the conceit that the United
States could order the world,” in the words of historian Ambrose.12 They thought
that American Democracy represented the best and strongest governmental
system in the world. One of the Founding Fathers James Madison had said:
The free system o f government we have established is so congenial with reason, 
with common sense, and with universal feeling, that it must produce approbation. 
... Our country, if  it does justice to itself, will be the workshop o f liberty to the 
civilized world, and do more than any other for the uncivilized.13
James Madison’s words became the beacon of American foreign policy making. 
His words showed the faith American people had in their political system, the use 
of common sense, and the concept of liberty. President Truman stated that the 
foreign policy objective of America in the Cold War Era was to: “Proclaim 
Liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants.”14 Americans had a belief 
that they were doing the right thing for other nations or for the well-being of the 
whole world, but other nations had their own principles and might not appreciate 
what the United States considered best.
11 Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938. (New York: Penguin 
Book, 1985), p. 110.
12 Ibid., p. 110.
13 Quote by Adrian S. Fisher, “The Principal Ingredients of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Department of State 
Bulletin. Vol.XXVI, No.660 (February 18, 1952), pp.244-245.
14 Harry Truman, “The Defense of Freedom,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXV, No.628 (July 9, 
1951), p.86.
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Adrian S. Fisher, the legal Adviser of the State Department, pointed out on 
February 18, 1952 that “America’s fortunate situation and what [they had] learned 
along the road that brought [them] to it imposes upon [them] an obligation to the 
rest of mankind.”15 In other words, Americans had a special vision of their own 
role in the world’s future. Owen Lattimore, a China specialist, wrote in 1940, 
“The key to the future of China lies neither in Japan nor in Russia, nor even in 
China itself. It lies right here in America.”16 In fact, many people at that time 
assumed that “America was destined to guide a new China to industrialism,
1 n
democracy, and a life of material well-being.” George Kennan, foreign policy 
adviser in the early Cold War, regarded this as “a tendency to create hazy and 
exalted dreams of intimacy with other peoples,” especially toward Chinese.18 It 
was ironic that Americans thought of themselves as exceptional when they were 
pursuing similar political and economic ambitions that European powers had 
pursued in China and Asia for more than a century. What the American people 
and government believed in was a myth. This myth combined with a faith in their 
own potential to overwhelm the reality of Chinese politics and cultural changes.
Because of this myth, Americans viewed the loss of China to Communism 
as a challenge to their leadership role in China. Furthermore, the loss of a 
potentially lucrative Chinese market caused great concern. Communism would
15 Adrian S. Fisher, “The Principal Ingredients o f U.S. Foreign Policy,” Department of State Bulletin.
Vol.XXVI, No.660 (February 18, 1952), p.245.
16 Quoted by Neumann, “Determinism, Destiny, and Myth in the American Image of China,” p. 1.
17 Ibid., p.l.
18 Ibid., p. 14. See also “The Future of Soviet Communist,” The New Leader. June 18, 1856, p.4.
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mean a closed economic system similar to the Soviet Union and that there would
be no free trade and no free flow of information. American economic and
cultural expansion would be halted. In this sense, ideological differences became
the fundamental focus of hostile debate between Beijing and Washington after
1949. Jealous and angry feeling weakened American policy makers’ ability to
examine the realities. There was a strong tendency to attribute the success of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the Soviet Union, which in turn deepened the
fear of the Soviet Conspiracy. John Foster Dulles, a consultant to the secretary of
state, wrote in early 1950:
The loss o f China to Communists, who, it now seems will work in Asia as junior 
partners o f Soviet Communism has had tremendous repercussions throughout the 
world. It has marked a shift in the balance o f power in favor o f Soviet Russia and 
to the disfavor o f the United States.19
From the American perspective, the loss of China to Communism upset the post 
war balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had expected China to be the American junior partner in 
Asia. Thus, when the CCP gained power in China, Americans were alarmed, and 
they determined to resist any further Communist expansion. The Non- 
Recognition policy was the beginning of this resistance.
For many years, historians argued about the role of ideology in influencing 
American foreign policy. One group, by Louis Hartz, Edward Weisband, and 
Michael Hunt, stressed that ideology can never be detached from foreign
19 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. Vol. I. (Washington DC.: 
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 314.
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onpolicy and that foreign policy is constantly influenced by ideology. Hunt 
defined ideology in American foreign policy in terms of its historical and cultural 
origins -- “racial hierarchy,” “liberty,” and “fear of revolution.” He further
argued that these deeply rooted cultural traditions were the main force in linking
01ideology to foreign policy making. Stephen Krasner applied this interpretation 
to individual policy makers’ decisions in the twentieth-century. He wrote:
During this period American leaders were moved by a vision o f what the global 
order should be like that was derived from American values and the American 
experiences — Lockean liberalism, and a nonrevolutionary, democratic, 
prosperous historical evolution.22
Krasner believed his interpretation explained why President Harry Truman and 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson were so concerned about losing China to 
communism and so disliked the policies o f the Chinese communists. Americans’ 
reactions to the radical changes in China, to a great extent, were governed by 
American cultural values and beliefs.
The other group, lead by George Kerman, disagreed. Kennan stressed that 
the American foreign policy experts could detach themselves from ideological 
dogma to grasp the reality of international affairs through their collective
23wisdom. Walter Lippmann also advocated this opinion. He believed that
20 See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1955), pp.58- 
59; Edward Weisband, The ideology of American Foreign Policy. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1973), 
p.61; Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1987), pp. 17-18.
21 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 17-18.
22 Stephen D. Kransner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign 
Policy. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 15.
23 See George Kennan, American Diplomacy. 1900-1950. (New York: New American Library, 1951),
Chap. 5.
14
24American foreign policy should be pragmatic and disavow ideology. Later 
historians like Norman Graebner and Arthur Schlesinger further argued that 
ideology should be separated from foreign policy and that being practical was the 
most important principle for foreign policy making. Hans Morgenthau claimed 
that ideology, rather than a guide to foreign policy, was a random and confusing 
factor.26
It is important to note that the second group of historians never deny that 
ideology influences foreign policy. In fact, the strength of ideology in affecting 
foreign policy varies historically, not always as strong as Hunt’s claim and not 
always as insignificant as Morgenthau believed. In Sino-American relations from 
1949 to 1953, however, ideology was very important to the clash between
97capitalism and communism, according to historian Jie Chen. But the clash 
between Chinese and American cultures was equally important as well.28 The 
following two chapters will demonstrate the significance of American culture, 
values, and ideology in affecting the United States government’s response to the 
rise of communism in China.
24 See Walter Lippmann, Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974).
25 See Norman A. Graebner, America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagon. 
(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1985); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “Foreign Policy and the American 
Character,” Foreign Affairs. (Fall, 1983), pp. 1-16.
26 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1985), p.87.
27 See Jie Chen, Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy: Case Studies in U.S. China Policy. (Westport, 
Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1992), p. 15.
28 Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy. (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 105.
CHAPTER II 
THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION
In late 1948, the Chinese Civil War was in its critical final stages. 
Following a series of stunning Communist military victories in northern China, 
the CCP conquered Manchuria in November, threatening Tienjin and Beijing, two 
important Chinese cities. On January 26, 1949, the Nationalist government 
informed American Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart and other diplomatic mission 
chiefs that the Chinese government (KMT) would move its capital from Nanjing 
to Guangzhou and asked diplomatic missions to move there as well.1 The 
Truman administration had to decide whether to keep Ambassador Stuart in 
Nanjing or follow the KMT to Guangzhou. Although it seemed that the United 
States faced the question of Nanjing or Guangzhou, the real question was to stay 
or leave because the KMT would lose the civil war. The United States 
government, therefore, had only two choices: it could either completely withdraw 
from China or stay in order to protect American interests.2 Eventually, President 
Truman ordered Ambassador Stuart to stay. This decision reflected Washington’s 
initial hope to maintain normal diplomatic channels of communication for future 
negotiation. Another major question was: Should the United States government 
recognize the Communist government in Beijing at that time. Concerning this
1 Edwin W. Martin, Divided Counsel: The Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China.
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986), p. 2.
2 Ibid., p.7.
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question, keeprng Stuart in Nanjing showed the “wait-and-see” attitude of the 
Truman administration. The United States government, moreover, urged other 
Western powers to maintain a “united front” of not recognizing the Beijing 
regime.
Since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, the United States 
had developed a set for moral constructs and principles of conducting foreign 
policy. “Wilsonian” is a term used to describe the policies that emphasized 
internationalism and moralism and were designed to extend freedom and 
democracy. Wilson feared radical and revolutionary change, believing that 
maintaining order was crucial for prosperity. He, thus, believed that the United 
States should not recognize any new revolutionary regime that disregarded 
international law, refused to repay its national debts, threatened order and 
stability, was controlled by a foreign power, or seized power through immoral 
means. Under traditional policy dating back to Thomas Jefferson, the United 
States usually recognized any government which maintained order and agreed to 
meet foreign obligations, such as debts. Wilson, however, added a third criterion: 
the new government had to come to power through a process that was accepted by 
the United States. Based on Wilson’s new criteria, the United States refused to 
recognize the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 because they were seen as German 
agents; they refused to pay back the national debts (under the Tsar’s rule) and 
seized power immorally. The United States government also believed that non­
recognition would help to undermine the survival of a new revolutionary regime.
17
After this, recognition became a diplomatic weapon. The Truman administration 
inherited Wilson’s values and practical concerns. It intended to use diplomatic 
pressures, such as granting recognition and economic aid, to press the Chinese 
Communists to yield to its demands.
The attitude of the CCP, however, was quite different. The Communists 
“were not going to play the diplomatic game by the international rules practiced 
in the West if  it did not suit them,” according to historian Edwin W. Martin.3 
This meant that the CCP would not follow any normal diplomatic practices in 
dealing with the western powers. Shi Yinghong, a Chinese historian, charges that 
Wilson’s refusal to recognize governments, which gained power through 
“unconstitutional means,” established “the precedent of American intervention 
into other nations’ domestic affairs.”4 Shi also believes that Wilson’s principle of 
international responsibility was designed to target those “revolutionary countries” 
which “determined to transform foreign relations and cast off imperialistic 
oppression.”5 The Communists’ aim indeed was to eliminate all western imperial 
influences in China. These divergent attitudes and objectives marked an initial 
rift between the two countries. As a result, while the United States wanted to 
force the Chinese communists to yield, the CCP pushed the United States to yield.
3 Ibid., p.8.
4 Yinhong Shi, “Problems concerning the American recognition of New China,” (“Lun Meiguo Chengren 
XinZhongguo Wenti, 1949-1950), World History TChina] fShiiie Lishil No.l (1991), p. 102.
5 Ibid., p. 102.
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Because of these differences, they further misinterpreted and misunderstood each 
other in the coming years.
The first significant conflict appeared when the CCP captured Mukden on 
November 1, 1948. According to William N. Stokes, American vice consul in 
Mukden, “the Communist command in Mukden surrounded the American 
Consulate General with troops, cut off its electricity and water, and placed the 
entire establishment under incommunicado house arrest.”6 The United States 
government tried many ways to contact the Mukden Consulate, but failed, and the 
incident became one of the significant barriers for improving relations between 
the CCP and the Truman administration. The CCP stressed their position that 
“in the absence of recognition or diplomatic relations, consular officials were 
merely private persons not entitled to carry out official function.”8 The United 
States government, nevertheless, had another view that “international custom has 
sanctioned continued exercise by resident foreign consuls of their legitimate and 
proper functions within their consular districts even during periods of non­
recognition” between governments.9
On October 24, 1949, the Mukden Consul General Angus Ward and four 
members of his staff were formally arrested by the Chinese Communists on the
6 William N. Stokes, “The Future between America and China,” Foreign Service Journal. January 1968, 
.15. See also Edwin W. Martin, Divided Counsel, p.8.
Sino-American relations in this paper refers to the relations between the new Communist China and the 
United States.
8 Martin, Divided Counsel, p. 12.
9 Quoted by Ibid., p.9.
19
charge Ward and his staff beat their Chinese employees. The United States 
government reacted strongly. Washington regarded this action as a “clear 
violation of established principles of international comity and practice respecting 
treatment o f foreign consular officials.”10 The State Department urged 
communist Chinese officials to handle the issue according to the “established 
principles of international law and practice respecting treatment of foreign 
consular officials,” and demanded transportation facilities so that American 
officials could leave Mukden.11 However, the United States government never 
mentioned what was really going on in Mukden or why Mukden was singled out. 
According to historian Michael H. Hunt, the Ward incident was an American 
responsibility because the Mukden consulate was the center o f an American 
espionage network. Historian Nancy Bemkopf Tucker also points out that the 
United States conducted espionage work through the Mukden consulate, 
“providing Chinese [Nationalists] agents with radio transmitters and secret
13 4codes.” The incident finally was resolved after Ward was released on 
November 21, 1949 and expelled from China.
When Philip Fugh, Ambassador Stuart’s adviser, asked about Mukden 
and other similar incidents, Huang Hua, the chief of the Alien Affairs Office,
10 U.S. Department of State, “No Response From Chinese on Release of Angus Ward and Staff,”
Department of States Bulletin. Vol.XXI, No.542, (November 21, 1949), p.760.
11 Ibid., p.760. See also Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. Vol.VHI, p. 1002.
12 Michael H. Hunt, “Mao Tse-tung and the Issue of Accommodation with the United States, 1948-1950,”
Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations. 1947-1950. ed. by Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs.
(New York, 1980), p.203-204.
13 Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, Patterns In the Dust: Chinese American Relations and the Recognition
Controversy 1949-1950. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.44.
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replied that “as soon as normal diplomatic relations [were] established, all such 
issues could be easily cleaned up.”14 Huang’s words revealed how important 
diplomatic recognition was for the Chinese Communists. America’s 
unconditional recognition represented the acceptance of the new government 
internationally, which would pave the way for the Beijing government to replace 
the KMT as the permanent member of the Security Council in the United Nations. 
It could also help the new government to strengthen its rule over China. For the 
CCP, recognition could enhance its position and bargaining power within the 
Communist bloc. For most of the Chinese, recognition meant the triumph of 
Chinese nationalism and it signified China would enter the international 
community as an equal player. Also, recognition would provide access to western 
economic aid, which was crucial for China’s devastated economy. More 
importantly, if the United States recognized the Beijing government 
unconditionally, it would signify America’s friendly attitude towards the Chinese 
Communists. The CCP, in turn, would feel more secure and be less hostile to the 
United States.
Therefore, the CCP hoped that the Mukden debacle would press the 
United States for early recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 
Mukden incident, however, deepened the misunderstanding between the two 
countries and worsened the prospects of American recognition. During a meeting
14 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. Vol. VIII, p.378.
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with Under Secretary of State James E. Webb, President Truman expressed his 
anger by saying that the United States should “thoroughly explore the possibility 
of blocking the movements of coal down the coast of China to Shanghai,” and 
“[sinking] any vessels which refused to heed [American] warning,” in order to 
demonstrate the strong position of the United States on Ward’s release. Truman 
also believed that such a move would slow British action towards recognition.15 
Although the American navy did not sink any Chinese vessels, Truman’s ideas 
showed Washington’s frustration with the Ward case.
More importantly, the Ward case aroused public anger in the United 
States. Americans were not only angry about the hostile action of the CCP, but 
also suspected the presence of strong Soviet influence in Manchuria, which 
strengthened the idea that the CCP was the puppet of the Soviet Union. Publicly, 
the Ward incident was presented as an obstacle to recognition of the PRC when it 
was established on October 1, 1949. According to a journal Monthly Report, 
which was published by the Millard Publishing Company in November 1949 in 
Shanghai, the American Government was actually using the Ward incident to 
delay recognition.16 It said, “Most political observers here agreed that American 
recognition would not have been forthcoming irregardless [sic] of the Ward 
incident.”17 Though Ward and his staff were released on November 21, 1949,
15 Ibid., p. 1008.
16 See Lanxin Xiang, “The Recognition Controversy: Anglo-American Relations in China, 1949,” Journal of 
Contemporary History. Vol.27. No.2 (1992), p.330.
17 Quoted by Ibid., p.330.
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considerable harm had already been done. The incident strengthened 
Washington’s determination to close some consular offices in the interior of 
China and only keep those in big cities open. In short, the Ward incident 
reflected that Beijing and Washington interpreted the international rules and 
practice — the treatment of foreign diplomats — totally differently and none of 
them were going to make any concession.
From early 1949 to the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, 
Beijing did not show much interest in the United States except in two special 
cases. The first one was Chou En-lai’s letter to Ambassador Stuart concerning 
economic aid on May 31, 1949. The second one was the invitation by Mao Tse- 
tung and Chou En-lai to Ambassador Stuart to visit Beijing, on June 28, 1949. 
These two Communist initiatives were quite significant because they showed that 
there was a possibility that the two countries could improve their relations during 
the first half of 1949. In fact, from January 1949 to August 1949, the United 
States government upheld its decision to keep its ambassador in Nanjing after the 
Communist occupation. Britain, during that time, also kept its ambassador there. 
Ambassador Stuart hoped that his presence might help to remove CCP’s
1Rsuspicion and maintain a channel of communication. Thus, in the period before 
Ambassador Stuart left China, there were some opportunities for the two
18 Martin, Divided Counsel, p. 25.
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countries to improve their relations and resolve their misunderstandings. Chou's 
letter and Mao’s invitation were the golden opportunities.
During 1949, Ambassador Stuart and his staff members met Huang Hua 
many times to discuss their diplomatic objectives. In one such meeting between 
Huang and Philip Fugh on May 6, 1949, Huang said clearly that the CCP’s main 
objectives were “to eliminate (1) feudalism and (2) American and British 
imperialism” in China.19 Therefore, the United States should have known what 
the Communists wanted. The CCP had already stressed that Americans should 
stay out of Chinese internal affairs. These demands, however, were against 
American interests. Washington expected the new China to follow American 
directions and to be its junior partner in Asia. When China fell into the hands of 
the Communists, the United States tried every means to press the CCP to follow 
American demands. Recognition was regarded by Washington as an effective 
weapon which Washington hoped would make Beijing yield. Therefore, on June 
2, 1949, when Huang Hua mentioned the issue of recognition by the United States 
based on “equality and mutual benefit,” Ambassador Stuart said that the United 
States would recognize the PRC if the CCP accepted international practice with 
respect to treaties.20
For the CCP, “equality and mutual benefit” meant that the United States 
should stay out of Chinese internal affairs and give up all its special rights and
19 Ibid., p.29.
20 Ibid., p.29.
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privileges in China. Although the United States had officially given up all 
unequal treaty rights and privileges, such as extra-territoriality, some privileges 
were still maintained informally by the Nationalist government. Foreigners, for 
example, were protected by their foreign legations. The racial discriminatory 
sign: “Chinese and dogs cannot enter!” had not yet been removed in front of many 
foreign-owned establishments. Therefore, the harassment of foreign officials and 
nationals was designed to get rid of these informal foreign privileges and foreign 
influence in general, and to end China’s national humiliation. The United States, 
however, wanted to maintain its influence, trading rights and privileges that were 
given by the KMT. Obviously, from the Communists’ perspective, Stuart’s 
demand of accepting “international practice with respect to treaties” was 
unacceptable because if the CCP accepted all treaties signed by previous Chinese 
governments, the new government would not only be responsible for all 
international debts, but also be obliged to tolerate the continuation of western 
imperial influence. This fundamental conflict became the major barrier to 
improving relations between the two governments.
Unexpectedly, on May 31, 1949, Chou En-lai sent a message to Consul 
General O. Edmund Clubb in Beijing, saying that the leadership of the CCP was 
seriously divided between Liu Shao-ch’i (pro-Moscow faction) and Chou En-lai 
(liberal faction). The liberal faction supported early establishment of relations 
with the Western powers in the hope that American economic aid would help 
China to get out of economic hardship. The pro-Moscow faction, nevertheless,
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stressed the support for the Soviet side. The final direction would be based on 
which faction won. When the message came to the eyes of the American 
officials, how did they interpret it? Clearly, this letter supported the argument 
that China needed American aid, and therefore the United States used this need to 
push the CCP to accept the American demands. This letter became one of the 
major arguments for the policy of non-recognition.
Consul General Clubb believed that this letter was a move “of high 
Communist policy” with the approval o f the Soviet Union. He explained that 
China needed to deal with the United States in order to avoid a “calamitous 
economic collapse.” Thus, this message represented the Communists’ hope to
“continue [a] diet of Soviet political bread but eke out [a] diet with American
9 1economic cake.” Even though Clubb had such feelings, he still encouraged the 
United States government to give Chou a reply. Chou, however, refused to make 
any arrangement to get the reply. According to Clubb’s analysis, Chou’s message 
“was designed [to] serve [the] political purpose of causing USA [to] view 
Communist leaders more sympathetically, and perhaps letting sympathy affect US 
attitude re[sic] trade or direct aid, but did not constitute sincere expression of 
Communist views.”22 Thus, even though the United States reacted 
sympathetically, Chou’s letter did not bring any significant reduction of Sino- 
American tension. To a great extent, the responsibility of losing this chance was
21 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. Vol.VIII, pp.363-364.
22 Ibid., pp.398-399.
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on the Chinese side instead of the American because it was the Chinese
communists who did not follow up, not the Americans.
During the same period of time, the capture of Shanghai by the
Communists exacerbated Sino-American tensions. Labor unrest and hostile
actions by the CCP further worsened the situation. The beating and detention of
American Vice Consul William Olive because of a minor traffic charge was the
most notorious example. Olive was arrested “while en[sic] route [to a] filling
station in jeep, apparently for alleged obstruction [of] Communists in parade.”
Since not many Chinese people could afford riding a jeep, those who rode in
foreign vehicles were usually identified as the privileged class, such as
government officials, merchants, or foreigners. Olive’s arrest revealed people’s
resentment toward foreigners’ luxurious lifestyle in China because most of the
Chinese people believed that the destitute condition in China was caused by
foreign oppression and encroachment. There were also the Callender case (June
1, 1949) and the Shanghai Tramway Company incident (June 23, 1949). In these
two cases, American employees were arrested by the Communists on charges of
mistreating their Chinese staff.24 Consul General John M. Cabot in Shanghai
summarized the pattern of these incidents as follows:
Storm o f protests at bad conduct o f foreigner sent to newspapers by fellow 
employees o f plaintiff, by peaceful onlookers, and by people in other occupations 
however unrelated to original plaintiff, accompanied by many readings o f moral 
that days o f imperialism and special privilege in Shanghai are over. Foreign 
inevitably found to be wrong, forced to recompense Chinese for damages
23 Ibid., pp. 1199-1200.
24 Ibid., p. 1185.
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suffered, and to make public apology promising never to repeat offense. Such 
chastisement and accompanying publicity in keeping with Chinese ideas o f “face” 
seem designed to humiliate rather than to punish severely.
This hostile atmosphere discouraged many American businessmen. There was an 
increasing desire to pack up and leave Shanghai “rather than submit to 
humiliations and insecurities of present situation,” according to Consul Cabot’s 
telegram to Washington on June 26, 1949 26 Even Ambassador Stuart and Consul 
Cabot’s attitudes were negative. They recommended Washington close “all 
Consular offices in China with possible exception Nanking and Peiping.”27 The 
feeling of disillusionment was stronger among Americans than the British who 
also suffered similar hardship and humiliation. While the British were trying to 
seek other ways to stay, such as extending recognition or negotiation, most of the 
Americans in China were packing up to leave. By leaving China, Americans 
demonstrated their discontent and disillusionment toward the Chinese 
communists.
Although the situation in June 1949 was unpleasant, the CCP presented a 
chance of reconciliation. On June 28, 1949, Ambassador Stuart received an 
invitation from Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to visit Beijing. This invitation 
was the result of Philip Fugh’s suggestion that Stuart visit his old university, 
Yenching University, on June 24. It is important to note that Fugh’s suggestion 
was without Stuart’s approval. Stuart summarized both the possible advantages
25 Ibid., p. 1185.
26 Ibid., p. 1185.
27 Ibid., p. 1308.
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and disadvantages of a visit in his report to Washington. The principal 
advantages would be the presentation of American views directly to the Chinese 
leaders and, at the same time, acquisition of the “most authoritative information 
regarding CCP intentions.” His visit would strengthen the liberal faction within 
the CCP, and it would be an indication of America’s “open-minded attitude 
towards changing political trends in China and probably would have beneficial 
effect on future Sino-American relations.” For the disadvantages, Stuart 
stressed that his visit would break the “united front” of the diplomatic corps in 
Nanjing. It would also enhance the CCP’s national and international prestige, and 
Mao would perceive that the United States would recognize a Communist China
' J Q
if the Nationalist Government lost the war. Because of these disadvantages, the
State Department ordered Stuart not to visit Beijing. This decision was
significant for the prospect of Sino-American reconciliation because instead of
moving forwards, Washington chose to give up this chance.
There was another major factor strengthening Washington’s decision not
to send Ambassador Stuart to Beijing. On June 30, even before Stuart replied to
Mao’s invitation, Mao published his “leaning to one side” policy in the essay “On
People’s Democratic Dictatorship.” Mao said:
Internationally we belong to the side o f the anti-imperialist front headed by the 
Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help, 
not to the side o f the imperialist front.30
28 Ibid., pp.766-767.
29 Ibid., pp.766-767.
30 Mao Tse-tung, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” Selected Words of Mao Tse-tung. Vol.III, 
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), pp.417.
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This stress on the importance of leaning to the Soviet side reversed the previous 
position of acquiring economic aid from the United States because Mao now 
believed it would be foolish to think of getting American or British aid.31 Mao’s 
stance clearly contradicted Chou’s letter and Huang Hua’s statement to Fugh of 
June 8 that China would need American aid. Mao rejected Chou’s liberal policy 
and ended speculation that economic necessity would force the Communists into 
some sort of accommodation with the West. It also explained why the 
Communists refused to receive an American reply to Chou’s letter.
The whole course of development, from Chou’s letter to the “leaning to 
one side” policy, represented the struggle over and the conclusion of Mao’s policy 
directive. The Communist leaders, at first, were uncertain of any policy move 
because each move would determine the destiny of the party. Since Mao never 
left China throughout his life, his conception of the western world was based 
either on second-hand sources or on his own imagination. The Communist 
leaders around him, except a few who had been to Europe like Chou En-lai and 
Deng Xiao-ping, were mostly educated in the Soviet Union. Although these 
Soviet trained leaders, such as Lin Biao and Liu Shao-ch’i, might not have had the 
strongest influence on Mao, their voice was definitely louder. It is important to 
note that Mao’s primary concern was the survival of the CCP, not the economic 
recovery of China. Therefore, he would do everything in order to have the party
31 Ibid., pp.415-417.
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survive and consolidate its control in China. As Mao pointed out in his paper, 
China could only survive by leaning either to the imperialist side or to the Soviet 
side. Since Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek had failed by leaning to the 
imperialists, Mao decided to lean to the Soviet Union. Mao had several reasons: 
first, a common ideological belief; second, signs of Soviet friendship (for 
example, the Soviet Union gave the CCP the weapons left by the Japanese in 
1945); and third, the uncertainty of the American support (because the United 
States still supported the KMT). Thus, it would be safer for the CCP to lean to 
the Soviet side. In the light of this, the “leaning to one side” policy served two 
major political purposes: unify the party and gain Soviet support. It was the first 
step to a military alliance (the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance with the Soviet 
Union). Mao need to gain Stalin’s trust because Mao rose to power without 
Soviet support. He broke with the Soviet faction within the CCP in the 1930s 
before the Long March. Thus, Stalin did not trust Mao. In order to gain Stalin’s 
trust, Mao had to do some “lip service.” He chose to deliver it before receiving 
Stuart’s reply to the invitation because he did not want to alienate the Soviet 
Union, regardless of whether Stuart came to Beijing or not. The “leaning to one 
side” policy was indeed a calculated political move.
The contradictory ideas and behaviors of the CCP indeed made it difficult 
for the United States government to react. Taking the literal meaning of Mao’s 
publication, policy makers in Washington were confused. By refusing to send
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Ambassador Stuart to visit Beijing, Washington gave up its chance to have a 
direct communication with Mao and Chou. Most importantly, it worsened the 
already weak Sino-American relations. Besides, Washington’s decision 
demonstrated the unwillingness of the United States government to recognize a 
regime that had not yet formed a national government, and at the same time 
reflected its unwillingness to contribute to the prestige of Communist leaders who 
were hostile to the United States.32 Mao’s “leaning to one side” declaration also 
strengthened Truman’s Non-Recognition policy because Americans tended to 
over-simplify these complicated issues by assuming the CCP had determined to 
follow the Soviet Union. Mao’s essay, together with the Mukden incident, 
impressed many Americans that the CCP was really Russia’s puppet. The 
American public became less willing to accept what it viewed as a puppet 
government in China, hardening the policy of Non-Recognition.
When Ambassador Stuart refused to visit Beijing, Communist actions 
against Americans intensified. On July 15, 1949, the Foreign Affairs Bureau in 
Shanghai ordered the director of the U.S. Information Service (USIS) to stop all 
its operations, including the Consulate General’s movies, concerts, library, news,
* 33and publicity. The consulate general in Beijing received similar orders 
because, it was reasoned, “the People’s Government [had] no diplomatic or 
consular relations with USA.”34 Even when Ambassador Stuart wanted to depart
32 Martin, Divided Counsel, p. 48.
33 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. Vol. VIII, p. 1232.
34 Ibid., p. 1095.
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China for the United States on consultation, the CCP raised many barriers to 
prevent him from leaving. The Communists, at the same time, kept on attacking 
American officials in China. Stuart believed that his departure problems related to 
his refusal to visit Beijing. According to what Chen Ying, a Chinese official, had 
told Fugh, “if Stuart had gone to [Beijing] all these little questions would have 
been easily settled.” However, it is important to note that in July 1949, the 
KMT launched a blockade against the Communists. There might be a possibility 
that the CCP wanted to keep Ambassador Stuart in Nanjing in order to gain 
American co-operation to break the blockade. The Communists’ hostile attitude 
was also caused by the release of the China White Paper in August 1949 by the 
U.S. State Department which asserted that “the Communist regime serves not 
[Chinese] interests, but these of Soviet Russia.”36
Facing the CCP’s hostile and “unreasonable” actions, Lewis Clark, 
Minister-Counselor, recommended that all U.S. official personnel should be 
withdrawn because “it [would] be impossible to ‘do business’ with Communists 
on any other than intolerant terms.” In fact, once Ambassador Stuart had left 
China on August 2, 1949, he never returned. On August 12, Washington decided 
to close the consulate general in Guangzhou before the city fell to the 
Communists. By mid-August, the United States government had even decided to
35 Ibid., p.785.
36 U. S. Department of State, United States Relations with China. (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 
1949), p.xvii.
37 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. Vol. VIII, pp. 1308-1309.
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close consular offices in six cities in China, including Tihwa, Chungking, and 
Kunming.38
The departure of Ambassador Stuart and the closing of consular offices 
were a significant stage in the development of United States policy toward 
Communist China. Instead of finding a way to stay, the United States and 
American citizens chose to retreat. Once Stuart had returned to the United States, 
it became even more difficult for Washington to have direct communication with 
the CCP. Each side, as a result, further hardened its own thinking towards the 
other. These decisions had significant impact on the British. First, the United 
States broke the common Anglo-American policy of keeping consulates in 
Communist territory. Second, the American departure increased the burden on 
British consular representatives in China, as the United States government asked 
the British to protect its interests and people in the areas where American 
consular offices had been closed.39 Despite Washington’s change in policy, 
London was still determined to keep its foot in the door of China.40
By the end of June, when the KMT launched a blockade to close those 
ports no longer under its control, Shanghai was the major target. A blockade was 
regarded as illegal unless it proved its effectiveness. It is important to note that 
foreign powers as well as the CCP could break the blockade if they had enough 
military power. Since Britain had a bigger population in Shanghai and the
38 Martin, Divided Counsel, p. 52.
39 Ibid., p.52.
40 Ibid., p.54.
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success of its “stay out” policy depended on the Communists’ need for foreign 
trade and technical assistance, London wanted to break the blockade as soon as 
possible. Thus, they asked for American co-operation in delivering supplies to 
Shanghai, but Washington rejected the British request, reasoning that they did not 
want to save the Communists. Similar to its policy of closing consular offices in 
China, the United States only thought of how to get Americans out of Shanghai 
instead of keeping Shanghai open.
The United States attitude strengthened Chinese anti-American feeling. 
Communists at that time made use of the blockade to further attack and humiliate 
American residents in China. In the words of historian Edwin W. Martin, “the 
blockade provided opportunities for Communist political exploitation at the 
expense of the United States; it enhanced the Communists’ efforts to divide the 
Western powers.”41 According to a report by the U.S. Consul General Walter P. 
McConaughy in Shanghai, the Communists treated the British and the American 
residents in Shanghai differently: the Communists were “up to their old device of 
playing one group of foreigners against another” in order to break the united front 
among various western communities.42 The division between the western powers, 
nevertheless, might not have been the sole responsibility of the Communists. 
Rather, fundamental differences between Washington and London split the two 
countries in their policy toward China.
41 Ibid., p.61.
42 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. Vol. VIII, p. 1292.
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When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established on October 
1, 1949, Washington and London disagreed on whether to recognize the new 
regime. Washington argued that the United States would recognize the PRC 
given:
(1) that it controlled the country that it clainied to control; (2) that it recognized 
its international obligations; and (3) that it ruled with the acquiescence of the 
people who were ruled.43
These three principles seemed reasonable, but from Beijing’s point of view, the 
second principle was not acceptable. One of the basic tenets of the CCP was anti­
imperialism. The PRC demanded an end to all unequal treaties signed between 
the European powers and the Qing government, and they wanted to expel all 
imperialists from China. For Beijing to recognize its international obligations 
required that the new government accepted all those international treaties signed 
by previous governments. As a result, the new regime would be responsible for 
all national debts, a huge economic burden for the new regime and its people. 
Also, receiving recognition was no guarantee o f receiving sufficient economic 
help from the United States, especially when the policies of Communism were 
fundamentally opposed by Capitalist powers.
Most importantly, if  the PRC moved closer to the United States, it would 
inevitably alienate the Soviet Union, jeopardizing its survival. Unlike leaning to 
the Soviet Union, there was no guarantee of success if the PRC moved closer to
43 Quoted in the statement by Philip C. Jessup, “U.S. Policy Toward China, 1949-50,” Department of State 
Bulletin. Vol.XXV, No.642 (October 15, 1951), p.605.
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the West. The United States had done nothing to ensure that it would not move 
against the CCP. What the Chinese Communists surely knew was that most 
Americans, including their policy makers, did not like Communism. The CCP 
was smart enough to see the potential danger of moving closer to the West. If 
Beijing had done so, accepting all conditions, the regime would have in turn 
alienated the Soviet Union, weakened its own revolutionary principles, and, fallen 
into the same trap as the Nationalist Government. At the same time, since the 
KMT had still not been defeated, if  the CCP had yielded the first time, it might 
have had to yield continuously to a possible demand of forming a coalition. 
Yielding to the West would never end until the day the CCP was no longer the 
CCP. This was what Mao wanted to avoid. Although Mao chose to lean to the 
Soviet Union, the CCP always maintained its independence. It supported the 
Soviet Union, but was definitely not controlled by it. In fact, the CCP refusal to 
make an initiative to move closer to the West did not mean that the West should 
not move closer to it. George Kennan carefully examined the situation and came 
up with the conclusion that the United States should recognize the CCP and 
normalize Sino-American relations immediately. In his address to Acheson and 
officials, Kennan argued that “the greatest single external threat to the complete 
Stalinization of China is that the U.S. should establish normal relations with the 
Chinese Communists and once more bring its influence to bear in that country,
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even if on a more restricted basis.”44 Kennan believed that recognizing the
Beijing government was in the best interest of the United States and of China.45
The British shared the same idea with Kennan. Although Britain had
similar principles as the United States concerning recognition, it was willing to
sacrifice those principles in order to stay in China. On November 1, 1949,
London consulted Washington on favoring early recognition. In a personal
message to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, British Foreign Minister Ernest
Bevin pointed out that there were four factors that the British considered:
(1) to protect British interests in China, (2) to strength the position in Hong Kong, 
Malaya and Singapore where there were vast Chinese communities, (3) to reduce 
troubles caused by non-recognition, and most importantly, (4) to [exploit the] 
potential rifts between Beijing and Moscow.46
Bevin defined British recognition as an acknowledgment of “the inescapable fact 
that the Chinese Communist Government [was] in effective control in China,” 
and having such control did not imply getting Britain’s approval47 London hoped 
that through early recognition, Britain could keep a “foot in the door.”48 Bevin 
argued that if the United States continued to condemn the Chinese Communists 
publicly, maintain diplomatic ties with the KMT, support the blockade of 
Shanghai, and object to the entry of the PRC to the United Nations, it would
44 Quoted in Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy. 1947- 
1950. (Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Press, 1991), p.240.
45 Ibid., p.240.
46 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1949. Vol.IX, p.225.
47 Ibid., pp.225-226.
48 Ibid., p.226.
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possibly alienate China from the West permanently.49 “The disadvantages of 
nonrecognition were so great as to outweigh any possible advantages to be 
obtained from securing Chinese Communist assurance of respect for international 
obligations,” in the words of Counselor Hubert Graves of the British embassy.50
Apparently, London was concerned about its economic interests. The 
British indeed had huge investments in China, and their trade with China was 
extensive. Compared to Britain, the United States did not have such substantial 
economic interests in China.51 It cannot be denied that Britain did not want to 
lose its trade with China, but mere recognition could hardly achieve this aim if 
the Beijing government was still hostile to the West. It was not difficult to 
predict that foreign trade would eventually die out because Communists usually 
discouraged free trade. Therefore, the British policy of recognition was more 
political than economic. The British believed that: first, if  the PRC gained 
western support, it would increase its sense of security and reduce its reliance on 
the Soviet Union; second, Britain could cultivate the fundamental conflicts 
between China and Russia such as border and sovereignty disputes, in order to 
split the two big communist powers; third, if the PRC really came closer to the 
West, it would induce Russia’s jealousy, and China might become a type of Asian
49 David McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: The Question of 
Accommodation with Peking, 1949-1950,” Diplomatic History. Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), p.28.
50 Quoted by Martin, Divided Counsels, p.87.
51 McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: The Question of 
Accommodation with Peking, 1949-1950,” p.29.
39
Yugoslavia, a communist state in Eastern Europe that broke with the Soviet 
Union in 1948.
The United States, nevertheless, did not totally agree with the British 
calculation. It was true that Washington wanted to see China develop into an 
Asian Yugoslavia, but Americans did not believe that recognition could help. 
According to historian David McLean, “assumptions about the monolithic 
character of communism were common in the non-Communist world in 1949, but 
in the case of China no Western state clung to these notions as tenaciously as did 
the United States.”52 America’s own myth about its special relationship with 
China explained the reason behind it. Since Americans believed that the Chinese 
people were on the side of the United States because of their traditional 
friendship, they believed that the Russians or the Communists would not be 
accepted by the Chinese people. Thus, the United States officials asserted that 
the CCP could only rule the country with the direct support of the Soviet 
Government. Since the CCP needed the help of the Soviet Union in order to 
maintain its rule, it would be impossible for other powers to drive a wedge 
between them. The only hope was that the Chinese people might overthrow the 
CCP themselves. In this case, granting recognition would only strengthen the 
CCP and weakened the anti-Communist factions in China. Therefore, the United
52 Ibid., p.35.
53 Ibid., p.35.
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States did not agree with the action of the British and kept refusing to recognize 
the PRC.
The problem of this interpretation was that the CCP did not really rely on 
Soviet support to gain control in China. Indeed, the CCP had strong public 
support. American Chinese expert John Paton Davies, Jr. had pointed this out 
and argued that the CCP was not a puppet of the Soviet Union. In fact, the only 
fear that the CCP had was that the United States might support the Nationalists to 
fight back. If the United States kept recognizing the KMT and supporting the 
KMT’s blockade against the mainland, there were good reasons of the CCP not to 
trust the United States.
Over Washington’s strenuous objections, London decided to extend its 
recognition on January 6, 1950 with the support of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and 
New Zealand. When London recognized the PRC, the united front among the 
western powers was broken. The controversy over whether the United States 
should recognize the PRC continued inside the United States until August 1950.
CHAPTER m
INTERNAL PRESSURES AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES
Although the United States did not agree with the British decision to 
recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the question remained: How did 
British recognition influence the Truman administration’s China policy? Did 
decision makers in the United States have any intentions to accommodate the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or did internal pressures discourage the United 
States recognition of the PRC during the Truman administration?
There are three different interpretations explaining the attitude of policy 
makers in the United States. According to historians Warren I. Cohen and John 
Lewis Gaddis, Secretary of State Dean Acheson did try to have an 
accommodation with Beijing before the PRC entered the Korean War. 
Accommodation here did not mean recognition, but it was the first step toward 
recognition. Cohen stresses that Acheson was restrained by political pressures 
from Congress, public opinion, colleagues within the administration, and even the 
President. Gaddis, on the other hand, believes that President Truman was 
Acheson’s partner in searching for a kind of accommodation with the Chinese 
Communists.1
1 Warren Cohen, “Acheson, His advisers, and China, 1949-50,” Uncertain Years: Chinese American 
Relations. 1947-1950. Ed. by Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1980), pp. 13-52; John Lewis Gaddis, “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?” Foreign Affairs. 
Vol. VII (January 1974), pp.390-397.
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A second interpretation is held by Lanxin Xiang, an Assistant Professor of 
Political Science at Clemson University, in South Carolina. He totally disagrees 
with the first interpretation and argues that “Acheson was never committed to 
pursuing a ‘Chinese Tito policy,’” but “along with President Truman, was 
consistent in taking a tough line with Peking.”2 He points out that Acheson
insisted “on China’s honoring ‘international obligation,’ including most of the
•2
Sino-U.S. bilateral treaties, as pre-conditions for recognition.” He further argues 
that the Anglo-American controversy over the issue of recognition showed that 
Acheson’s China policy was consistently hostile and irritable.4
A third interpretation is presented by historian David McLean who 
believes that Acheson started to consider the possibility of seeking 
accommodation in his policy making only at the end of October 1949, but the 
consideration did not last as long as Cohen and Gaddis claimed. He argues that 
“the State Department, and American officialdom generally, showed a far greater 
reluctance to entertain the idea of coming to terms with the Chinese Communists 
than did other Western governments, and that a policy of antagonism toward the 
CCP was given greater consideration in the United States than in other Western 
states.”5 Instead of arguing that internal political forces hindered the policy of
2 Lanxin Xiang, “The Recognition Controversy: Anglo-American Relations in China, 1949,” Journal of 
Contemporary History. Vol.XXVII, No.2 (1992), p.319.
3 Ibid., p.319.
4 Ibid., p.320.
5 David McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: The Question of 
Accommodation with Peking, 1949-50,” Diplomatic History. Vol.X, N o.l, (Winter 1986), p.30.
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accommodation, McLean points to the influence of the strong China myth upon 
Acheson and other American officials.6
Policy makers, in fact, are not machines, and their minds will change 
according to the way they interpret external challenges. Acheson or other 
officials might change their feelings, interpretations, or policy decisions in 
different periods. Indeed, some factors were totally beyond their control or even 
their imagination. As the Secretary of State, Acheson could hardly make a 
difference unless he had the strong support either of the administration or the 
public. In this sense, the democratic system in America had an important role in 
shaping the Non-Recognition policy. The China myth would not have been so 
influential upon policy makers if it had not had popular support. The power of 
the China myth was revealed through the attitude of public opinion, the success of 
the China Lobby, a powerful lobbying group formed by the Nationalist 
Government with the support of some American pro-Chiang and anti- 
Communists groups or individuals, and the rise of McCarthyism, a paranoid and 
fanatical movement to hunt-down suspected Communists spies within the United 
States government. To a great extent, the China myth distorted the way 
Americans interpreted changes in China. Accordingly, the China myth and 
internal political pressures should not be separated in analyzing the
6 Ibid., pp.30-3 5.
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administration’s reactions to the rise of Communist China and the formation of 
the Non-Recognition policy.
The first question to be clarify is: Did the Truman administration ever 
have an idea of accommodation with the PRC? The answer is “Yes,” but I agree 
with McLean that the idea lasted only for a very short period of time, from 
November 1949 to January 1950. On December 23, the State Department issued 
a confidential document entitled “Policy Information Paper -- Formosa.” The 
document claimed that the loss of Formosa (Taiwan) was “widely anticipated” 
and that “the manner in which civil and military conditions there have 
deteriorated under the Nationalists add weight to the expectation.”7 The State 
Department was pessimistic about the future of Taiwan, and thus, searching for 
accommodation with the CCP was necessary if the United States wanted to 
continue to have relations with China.
On the same day, however, the Joint Chief Staff (JCS) sent a 
memorandum to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, saying that “a modest, well- 
directed, and closely-supervised program of military aid to the anti-Communist 
government in Taiwan would be in the security interest of the United States.”8 
The JCS suggested that the United States government should protect Taiwan from 
communist attack. Acheson and the State Department were strongly against this 
suggestion. In fact, President Truman did not want to continue supporting the
7 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1949. Vol.IX, p.460.
8 Ibid., p.463.
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Nationalist regime in Taiwan. The administration revealed its lack of faith 
towards the KMT government in the China White Paper (1949). The paper 
described the KMT as a corrupt and un-democratic regime that was doomed to 
failure. Eventually, Truman made his decision and openly announced, on January 
5, 1950, that the United States government would “not provide military aid or 
advice to Chinese forces on Formosa,” nor did it “have any intention of utilizing 
its armed forces to interfere in the present situation” there.9 It was the first time 
since the beginning of the Chinese Civil War that the United States government 
announced a “hands-off’ policy over China. Truman sent a clear signal to the 
PRC that the United States would not interfere if it attacked Taiwan. In fact, 
from this point onward, the United States government did not allow items such as 
bombers and heavy tanks to be transported to Taiwan with American funding 
until the Korean War broke out in June, 1950.10 Truman’s statement indeed is 
quite significant in understanding the gradual change of attitude within the 
administration. Ideologically, the administration was still anti-Communist, but 
practically, Washington was trying to open more policy options for the United 
States in dealing with the Communist regime in China because it wanted to 
protect American commercial interests in China. In this sense, from November 
1949 to January 1950, the administration was moving toward a form of
9 U.S. State Department, Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXH, No.550, (January 16, 1950), p.79.
10 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. Vol.XI, p.256-257.
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accommodation. It is important to note that during that period of time, the State 
Department had a relatively free hand in making its China policy.
Nevertheless, Truman’s announcement did not bring any positive reaction 
from the PRC. Unexpectedly, on January 6, 1950, the same day on which the 
British government recognized the PRC, the Beijing Municipal Military Control 
Commission made a move that squelched any hope of accommodation. It 
announced that the Central People’s Government would requisition land on which 
military barracks had been built under the unequal treaty system.11 Unfortunately, 
the American consular compound in Beijing was included. From the American 
perspective, nevertheless, since the former American military barracks had 
already been removed and turned into consular office, the PRC had no reason to 
seize the American consular compound. The Consul General O. Edmund Clubb 
at Beijing tried to contact Chou En-lai to clarify the American position many 
times, but did not receive a single response. On January 14, according to the 
report by the State Department, “the premises of the Consulate General were 
invaded by the police and four civilian officials.”12
The immediate effect of this proclamation was the requisitioning of the 
American property in Beijing, but most importantly, the incident was closely 
related to the question of respect for treaties entered into by previous Chinese 
governments. The State Department condemned the CCP by saying that:
11 New China News Agency, Daily News Release. No.261 (January 19, 1950), p.77.
12 U.S. Department of State, “Communists Take U.S. Property in China,” Department of State Bulletin. 
Vol.XXH, No.551 (January 23, 1950), p. 119.
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The United States Government takes an extremely serious view o f this situation, 
which constitutes a flagrant violation o f our treaty rights and o f the most
13elementary standards o f international usage and conduct.
Chinese action caused great resentment within the United States because
Americans were extremely sensitive about property rights. They were willing to
wage war against those who disregarded their property rights. As a result, the
seizure of American property by the Communists led to the strict decision to
withdraw all American officials from the PRC.
However, why did the Chinese Communists carry out this policy?
According to Consul General Clubb, Communists might have considered three
possible American responses to their actions:
(1) speeding up American recognition, (2) withdrawal Consulate to main 
compound with Americans humiliated and prestige reduced, while Communists 
could claim “victory over imperialists,” (3) at worst, complete withdrawal of 
Consulate from Peiping. It seems improbable Communists anticipated present 
consequences, that is, complete withdrawal from China.14
The first option was possible because at the beginning the British consular 
compound was included, but after Britain recognized the Beijing regime, its 
consular compound was exempted. The second option was reasonable because it 
fit the long established goal of the CCP in driving all foreign imperialists out of 
China. The third option, however, is more difficult to explain. If the 
Communists did not anticipate the serious effects of the seizure of U.S. property, 
why did they still consider that the withdrawal of the United States Consulate 
would be good for them? According to an American officials’ analysis, it was not
13 Ibid., p. 119.
14 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United State. 1950. Vol. VI, p.287.
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just the Chinese Communists who made the decision, there was something more. 
Clubb felt that the Soviet Union or pro-Russian Chinese Communists might have 
desired an American withdrawal from China in order to isolate China from the 
West.15 Clubb5 s explanation showed that some American officials tended to 
relate every single hostile action of the Chinese government to a Soviet 
conspiracy.
The seizure of American property had great impact on American public 
opinion. The anti-Communist feeling among the American public was intensified. 
A British professor, R. Ovendale, observed that once the American diplomatic 
representatives had left China, it was unlikely for them to return unless American 
public opinion improved. Public opinion, however, continued to deteriorate.16 
Through the increasing influence of the China Lobby and the rise of 
McCarthyism, we can see the general feeling of disillusionment among the 
American public.
Public opinion had long been an important political force in the United
States. In his remarks concerning the administration’s Taiwan policy, on January
16,1950, Secretary Acheson said:
I want to [remind] you that I have said very often in these meetings that the 
foreign policy o f the United States is determined not merely by what the State 
Department says, or not even by what the President says, and not even by what 
the Congress says, but reflects the sum total o f the activities, thoughts, and speech 
of the American people.17
15 Ibid., p.287.
16 R. Ovendale, “Britain, the United States, and the Recognition of Communist China,” The Historical 
Journal. Vol.XXVI,No.l (1983), p.153.
17 U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXH, No.550, (January 16, 1950), p.79.
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Making these remarks right after the seizure of American property in Beijing had 
a special implication. Acheson wanted to tell the Communists that any decision 
made by the United States government was based on public opinion. In this 
sense, the decision to withdraw all the American officials was not a decision of 
the State Department but a general request by the American people in responding 
to what the PRC had just done. Therefore, if the PRC wanted to improve 
relations with the United States, it would have to do something to settle the public 
discontent.
Indeed, it is hard to determine whether the Truman administration was 
directed by public opinion because public response over the issue of recognition 
was so close to the administration’s criticism of the PRC. According to the China 
White Paper, an official publication on the Chinese Civil War, the administration 
condemned the CCP because it submitted itself to the Soviet domination. In a 
letter to President Truman, which was included in the White Paper, Secretary 
Acheson said:
The Communist leaders have forsworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly 
announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia, which during the last 50 
years, under czars and Communists alike, has been most assiduous in its efforts to 
extend its control in the Far East.18
Acheson’s attitude was widely accepted by the public. According to a Gallup Poll 
in November 1949, among the 76 percent of those who heard about the
18 Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President Harry S. Truman, July 30, 1949, Letter o f Transmittal, in 
White Paper, p.xvi, quoted by Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese American Relations 
and the Recognition Controversy 1949-1950. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.28.
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Communist regime in China, 42 percent did not favor recognition.19 Another 
survey in May 1950 showed that the majority of people who had a clear concept 
about the nature of regime in China, favored the Non-Recognition policy.20 In 
June 1950, a survey asking whether Communist China should be seated in the 
United Nations showed that 58 percent disapproved. A majority of the population 
(over 80 percent) believed that the Chinese entered the Korean War at the order 
of the Soviet Union.21 These surveys showed that the public favored the policy of 
non-recognition. They distrusted the PRC because they thought of it as the 
puppet of the Soviet Union. In this case, what the American public believed and 
what the United States government had emphasized were similar. The 
administration should bear the responsibility of deepening the anti-Communist 
sentiment in the United States that eventually gave rise to the anti-Communist 
hysteria of the period.
From the seizure of the Beijing consular compound to the beginning of the 
Korean War, there was intense political pressure on the State Department. The 
activities of the China Lobby intensified when Truman announced his “hands- 
o ff7 policy. The pro-Chiang and anti-Communist China Lobby formed originally 
by the Nationalist Government to secure American political and economic aid 
was led by Chiang Kai-shek’s wife. It included publishers, such as Roy Howard, 
William Randolph Hearst, and Henry Luce, and disgruntled military leaders, such
19 The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion. 1935-1970. Vol.l, (New York: Random House, 1972), pp.880-881.
20 Ibid., p.915.
21 Ibid., p.955.
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as General Claire Lee Chennault, General Douglas MacArthur, and Major 
General Patrick J. Hurley.22 The lobby worked through many variegated 
organizations and publications, such as the Universal Trading Corporation, the 
American China Policy Association, the Committee to Defend America by 
Aiding Anti-Communist China, The China Monthly, and Plain Talk. In the words 
of historian Charles R. Kitts, the China Lobby “had money, public relations firms, 
and a sophisticated propaganda machine at its disposal.”23
The influence of the China Lobby was further strengthened by the China 
Bloc in the Congress. The China Bloc was an informal organization of highly 
conservative Republican and Democratic Congressmen. Republicans such as 
Senator Owen Brewster of Maine, Senator Alexander Smith of New Jersey, 
Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan, Representative O. K. Armstrong of 
Missouri, Representative Lawrence Smith of Wisconsin, and Representative John 
Vorys of Ohio, as well as Democratic Senators such as Pat McCarran of Nevada 
and James Eastland of Mississippi, were among the China Bloc’s congressional 
members. They constantly pressed for greater support for the Nationalist 
Government and reduced debate to hard-line dichotomies of “red” and “white,” 
pro- or anti-Communist. They worked hard to overturn the Truman 
administration’s hands-off policy. When Beijing seized American consular
22 Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974),
p.212.
23 Charles R. Kitts, The United States Odvssey in China. 1784-1990. (New York: University Press of 
America, 1991), p.203.
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premises and property, Republican Senator William F. Knowland of California, 
who was a member of the China Bloc, even demanded Acheson’s resignation.24 
The China Bloc, together with the China Lobby, became two of the most 
significant domestic political pressures upon the administration not to recognize 
the PRC.
The power of the China Bloc and China Lobby was strengthened when
Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin delivered his well-known
speech before the Women’s Republican Club at Wheeling, West Virginia, on
February 9, 1950. McCarthy said:
I have here in my hand a list o f 205 ... a list o f names that were made known to 
the Secretary o f State as being members of the Communist Party and who 
nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.25
He made use o f the anti-Communist hysteria to charge that the administration, 
especially the State Department, was controlled by Communists and Communist 
sympathizers who intentionally lost China. According to historian Nancy 
Bemkopf Tucker, although McCarthy was ignorant of Chinese affairs and had no 
special interest in the East, he “used the issue to further his political career.” 
The China Lobby and the China Bloc, in order to strengthen their argument of 
“Administration betrayals of Chiang Kai-shek,” supplied McCarthy with 
information about any possible target of attack within the administration.27 As a
24 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: Mv Year in the State Department. (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1969), p.354.
25 Quoted by John D. Peurifoy, “Review of Charges That Communists Infiltrate Department,” Department 
of State Bulletin. Vol.XXH, No.567, (May 15, 1950), p.752.
26 Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 167.
27 Ibid., p. 176.
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result, the China Lobby, the China Bloc, and McCarthy formed a powerful
internal political pressure group to challenge the administration.
Working in concert, the China Lobby, the China Bloc, and Senator
McCarthy used every possible rationale to discredit the administration. From
McCarthy’s Wheeling speech onward, Acheson together with his China
specialists were all under heavy attack for being “soft” on communists.
Defamatory attacks also focused on scholars, journalists, and even military
officers. The most famous case was the conviction of Alger Hiss, a former State
Department officer. Because Hiss had attended the Yalta Conference with
President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the World War II, his conviction for
peijury pushed Communist hysteria to a new height. After Hiss’s conviction, all
officers and advisers in the State Department became suspects. According to
Acheson’s book Present at the Creation, the President’s political enemy,
Republican Senator William E. Jenner of Indiana, condemned the administration:
It is tragic, Mr. President, that General Marshall is not enough o f a patriot to tell 
the American people the truth o f what has happened, and the terrifying story o f 
what lies in store for us, instead o f joining hands once more with this criminal 
crowd of traitors and Communist appeasers who, under the continuing influence 
and direction o f Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson, are still selling America down the 
river.28
These attacks continued until Truman left office in January 1953. Secretary 
Acheson described this period as “a time of work and troubles, a somber time.”29
28 Quoted by Acheson, Present at the Creation, p.365.
29 Ibid., p.354.
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Because of McCarthy’s persecution, many remarkable government 
advisers, including Owen Lawrence Rosinger, John Fairbank, and Nathaniel 
Peffer, lost their reputations for expertise. Famous institutions, such as the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, were destroyed. Even some important government 
officials’ careers were terminated, including famous Chinese experts John T. 
Flynn, John Stewart Service and O. Edmund Clubb. Even Secretary Acheson 
came under severe attack. According to historian Tang Tsou, “many Americans 
expressed their anxieties over Far Eastern affairs by accepting McCarthy’s theory 
of conspiracy as a salve to their wounded pride and by acclaiming or acquiescing 
in his hunt for non-existent Communists in the State Department as a substitute 
for a search for a workable policy.”30 Public opinion polls showed that 
McCarthy’s charges did have support from Americans. Among 84 percent of 
those who had heard McCarthy’s charges, 39 percent thought that his “exposure” 
of Communists a good thing for the country. The Gallup Poll also reported that 
“among college-trained persons interviewed, 41 percent said they thought the 
McCarthy charges [were] harmful, while 46 percent said they [were] a good thing 
for the country, and 13 percent [had] no opinion.”31 Another poll, which was 
done in June 1950, showed that the 78 percent of people who had heard about the 
charges approved or believed them. These data revealed that the fear of Russian 
or Communist penetration had captured the minds of many Americans. Because
30 Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China 1941-1950. Vol.2 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1963), p.539.
31 The Gallun Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1970. pp.911-912.
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of this, historian Claude A. Buss points out that recognition of the PRC became a
kind of political litmus test: “those who opposed it [recognition] were politically
wholesome, true-blue pro-Americans, and those who supported it were politically
dubious, pink pro-Communist.”32 Under such circumstances, it was hard for the
Secretary of State to seek accommodation with Communist China in the time
when Americans were strongly anti-Communist.
Why did the public overwhelmingly support McCarthy’s charges?
Historian Ross Y. Koen points out that the Chinese Nationalists effectively
exploited the weaknesses of American fears, beliefs, and disillusionment:
The Chinese planned and executed the exploitation o f their claims and grievances 
through the skillful use o f Americans who, motived by fear, ambition, missionary 
zeal, and the desire for profitable markets, were disgruntled and upset at what 
they considered the loss o f China.33
In other words, the Nationalists exploited the myth of a special American 
relationship with China to achieve their political aims. The loss o f the potential 
Chinese market to Communism supplied the opportunity for the rise of 
McCarthyism. The reason McCarthyism overwhelmed the opinions of East 
Asian or Chinese experts and expelled them from the decision-making process, 
however, was simple: popular anti-intellectualism among Americans. McCarthy 
appealed to American beliefs that the United States was formed upon the wisdom 
of the common man, the so-called “yeoman farmer,” who used common sense in
32 Claude A. Buss, China: The People’s Republic of China and Richard Nixon. (San Francisco: W. H. 
Freeoan and Company, 1972), p. 74.
33 Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p. 198.
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'XAsolving problems. Americans distrusted intellectuals because intellectuals tend 
to express simple things in complicated ways and because they usually displayed 
a sense of superiority to ordinary people. As a result, common people suspected 
the experts’ advise and rebelled against intellectuals’ manipulation.
With McCarthyism, Americans swept aside their best advisers, who 
suggested a realistic policy to deal with Communist China, and weakened their 
foreign policy institutions. It also reduced the willingness of American 
intellectuals to suggest a new China policy. Koen concludes that McCarthyism, 
together with the work of the China Lobby and the China Bloc, “seriously 
affected the ability of the vast majority of China specialists in the United States to 
continue to provide the American people with objective reports and 
interpretations of events in China.”35 Indeed, the China Lobby, the China Bloc 
and McCarthyism were the strongest internal forces in preventing official 
recognition of Communist China.
The Chinese Nationalists also made use o f the internal political rivalry 
between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party to achieve their political 
aim of acquiring American protection. In order to discredit the Democrats, the 
Republicans blindly attacked Truman’s China policy and supported McCarthy’s 
unreasonable charges. Even after Truman had left office, McCarthyism and the 
Communist hysteria continued under the Republican President Dwight
34 “Yeoman farmers” referred to those farmers, who owned their own piece of land, were economically and 
politically independent.
35 Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p. 198.
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Eisenhower’s administration. As a result, the Republican president was “forced
to continue all the concessions made by [his] predecessors and add new
'\£ \[concession] o f [his] own,” according to historian Ross Y. Koen. To a great 
extent, Eisenhower’s failure to recognize the PRC when he entered the White 
House in 1953 was closely related to the impact of McCarthyism and the work of 
the China Lobby. In short, the strong domestic pressures that prevented 
Acheson’s attempt to make accommodations extended the non-recognition policy 
from January to June in 1950 and continued to affect U.S. China policy for years 
to come.
If the China Lobby, the China Bloc, McCarthyism and the Communist 
hostile actions were forces that prevented the Truman administration from 
coming to any kind of accommodation with the PRC, the Korean War, which 
began on June 25, 1950, was the death-blow. North Korean troops, equipped with 
Soviet weapons, attacked South Korea. The South Koreans, surprised and poorly 
equipped, retreated rapidly. Washington reacted immediately. On June 25 and 
June 27, the Security Council o f the United Nations with the Soviet Union absent 
decided to give air and sea support to the troops of the South Korean Government 
with the objective to resume its “status prior to the invasion from the north and of 
re-establishing the peace broken by that aggression.”37 As a result, the United
36 Ibid., p.209.
37 Address by Dean Acheson, “Act of Aggression in Korea,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, 
No.575 (July 10, 1950), p.46.
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States together with other western powers, entered the war and attacked North 
Korean forces under the banner of the United Nations.
Secretary Acheson interpreted North Korean’s attack as “part of the world 
strategy of international communism.” He strongly believed that if the members 
of the United Nations did not protect South Korea, such aggressive methods
n o
would be used elsewhere. His interpretation was supported by a long report
prepared by the National Security Council on August 25,1950:
USSR action in regard to Korea, and its employment o f satellite forces there, 
should be regarded not as an isolated phenomenon but possibly as part o f a 
general plan which might involve correlated action in other parts o f the world.39
The NSC believed that the Korean War was not a local war but a war of Soviet 
expansion. The report argued that the United States should check Soviet 
expansion in Asia. It also mentioned the possibility that Communist China would 
enter the war under Soviet direction.40 It meant that Washington had already 
predicted the possibility that the Chinese would enter the conflict but on wrong 
assumptions.
In order to justify his decision to enter the Korean War, President Truman 
presented the grand aim of American intervention in Korea as a struggle for 
human liberty:
Our men, the men o f other free nations, are defending with their lives the cause o f 
freedom in the world. They are fighting for the proposition that peace shall be the 
law o f this earth.41
38 Ibid., pp.49-50.
39 U.S. Department o f State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. Vol.I, p.379.
40 Ibid., p.382.
41 Address by Harry Truman, “Act of Aggression in Korea,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, 
No.575 (September 11, 1950), p.407.
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These were words which Americans wanted to hear. According to the opinion 
poll, in September 1950, 65 percent o f the population believed that intervention 
was not a mistake and 64 percent believed that they should continue the 
fighting42
Just shortly after the attack, Truman made a very important decision by
ordering the Seventh Fleet to enter the Taiwan Strait. He instructed the navy to
“defend Taiwan against invasion or attack by the Chinese Communists” and to
“insure that Taiwan will not be used as a base of operations against the China
mainland.”43 Truman’s decision indeed reversed his “hands-off’ announcement
of January 5, 1950. Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs,
explained the President’s decision:
In order to insure that United Nations forces operation in Korea would not be 
heavily threatened from an important flank position and in order that in that 
period o f crisis there would not be a sudden shift in the military position o f 
Formosa, the President ordered the Seventh Fleet to insure the military 
neutralization o f that island and to protect the flank o f United States forces in 
Korea.44
Rusk’s explanation seemed to be reasonable. The impact of this decision, 
however, was detrimental. Even before sending the Navy, John Foster Dulles, a 
consultant to the Secretary of State, had already concluded that there was a risk of 
Chinese intervention. Dulles, nevertheless, stressed that “sometimes such a risk 
has to be taken in order to preserve peace in the world and keep the national
42 The Gallup Poll: Public Opinions. 1935-1970. pp.950-951.
43 Statement by Harry Truman, Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, No.575 (July 31, 1950), p. 165.
44 Remarks by Dean Rusk, “Security Problem in Far East Areas.” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII,
No.596 (December 4, 1950), p.892.
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prestige required if we are to play our indispensable part in sustaining a free 
world.”45 These words clearly reflected that within Dulles’ mind, national 
prestige and honor were far more important than the risk of expanding the war. 
In this sense, national prestige overruled any actual strategic concerns. 
Aggressive leadership became American foreign policy’s direction.
The response of the Beijing government to Truman’s military actions was 
indignant. They charged that “the United States of America [had] invaded 
Chinese territory, violated Chinese sovereignty, and [was] threatening China’s 
security.”46 Beijing denounced the United States for supporting the Nationalist 
blockade of Shanghai, violating Chinese territorial air-space with repeated 
bombings of Chinese towns and villages in Manchuria since August 28, and 
turning the United Nations into an instrument to conceal United States 
aggression.47 In response to these charges, Ambassador Warren R. Austin 
expressed the willingness of the United States Government to investigate and 
compensate for any destruction and injuries to Chinese citizens.48 Nevertheless, 
harm had already been done. The sudden reversal of American policy toward 
Taiwan had intensified Beijing’s distrust of American intentions. Communist 
leaders doubted the reliability of any American declarations.49
45 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. p.Vol.I, p.316.
46 Quotation in a statement by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, “U.S. Appeals to Chinese Communists to 
Stop Aggression in Korea,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, No.597 (December 11, 1950), p.931.
47 Ibid., p.931.
48 Statement by Austin, “U.S. Appeals to Chinese Communists to Stop Aggression in Korea,” pp.934-935.
49 Tsou, America’s Failure in China, pp.561-562.
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Beijing’s doubts and fears were intensified when Washington decided to 
unify Korea by force, regardless of Beijing’s warnings. Chou En-lai had warned 
several times that “the Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign 
aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbor being savagely 
invaded by the imperialists.”50 From Chou’s remark, it was clear that Beijing 
opposed further American intervention in Korea, but Acheson did not take Chou’s 
message seriously. He regarded the remark as merely a warning, not an 
“authoritative statement of policy.”51 Moreover, since the decision of unification 
was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations dated October 7, 
1950, Acheson believed that forced unification should not be regarded as 
aggression. In order to lessen Chinese’s doubt, Truman promised on November 
16, 1950 that the United Nations forces would not attack near the Chinese frontier 
and United Nations forces would withdraw when Korea was unified.52 Just as 
Chou had warned, however, Chinese “volunteers” entered the battlefield in North 
Korea in November 1950.
President Truman perceived the intervention as a “new act of aggression 
in Korea which was only a part of a world-wide pattern of danger to all the free
50 Quoted by Charles R. Kitts, The United States Odyssey in China. 1784-1990. (New York: University 
Press of America, 1991), p. 201.
51 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p.452.
52 Statement by Harry Truman, “To Take Every Step To Prevent Extending Hostilities in the Far East,” 
Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, No.595 (November 27, 1950), p.852.
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nations of the world.”53 In order to secure support from the public, he linked the 
Korean War to the American Revolution and simplified the cause:
We fought it for the simple, limited aim o f securing the right to be free, the right 
to govern ourselves. We fought it to secure respect for the principles o f the 
Declaration o f Independence ... We are not fighting there to conquer China or to 
destroy the Soviet Empire. We are fighting for a simple aim — as important to us 
today as the goal o f independence was in 1776 — the aim o f securing the right o f 
nations to be free and to live in peace.54
Was the war really that simple? If the Americans did not destroy the enemy, how 
could it win the war? According to historian Edwin W. McLean, “there was a 
pugnacious side to Truman’s character, closely associated with a tendency to 
reduce complex subjects to black and white simplicities.” A large number of 
Americans shared this tendency with Truman. They looked at the world in the 
simple terms of right or wrong, black or white. Refusing to understand the 
radical changes in China, Americans stuck to their myth.
In fact, most Americans at the beginning agreed with Truman, but as time 
passed, especially when the Chinese Communists entered the war, they began to 
question and retreat. By January 1951, over 66 percent of interviewed Americans 
demanded the administration pull out American troops as soon as possible, and 
49 percent believed that the administration had made a mistake in deciding to 
defend South Korea.56 People demanded the government stop the fighting and
53 Statement By Harry Truman, “Chinese Communist Attack on Korea: Demands Strengthening of Free 
World’s Defense,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, No.597 (December 11, 1950), p.926.
54 Harry Truman, “The Defense for Freedom,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXV, No.629 (July 16, 
1951), p.84.
55 David McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: The Question of 
Accommodation with Peking, 1949-1950,” Diplomatic History. Vol X, N o.l (Winter, 1986), p.32.
56 The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1970. pp.960-961.
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negotiate. At the same time, people lost faith in the President’s power of sending
American troops abroad. More than 57 percent of the interviewers disapproved
of Truman’s performance.57 Even though the public did not support the war and
his popularity continued to decline, the President did not stop fighting
immediately. Truman and Acheson believed that America still had the power to
win the war because they did not think that the CCP had power to endure. This
time, the President was acting against public opinion. In military and strategy
areas, the administration was less influenced by the public opinion. From this
point onward, it was not only the public who did not want to recognize the PRC,
but also Truman and his officials.
The impact of the Korean War upon Sino-American relations was
significant. Ambassador Philip C. Jessup pointed out that:
The attack upon the Republic o f Korea on June 25, 1950 further aggravated the 
situation and constituted additional reasons for [their] non-recognition policy 
since it was readily apparent that the Chinese Communists were providing 
material and manpower to the North Koreans.58
It became less possible for the United States government to recognize a 
Communist regime that supported a United States enemy — North Korea. 
Ambassador Jessup further stated that the United States would prevent the seating 
of Communist China in the United Nations. Consequently, Sino-American 
relations continued to be hostile and rough. It was hard, if not impossible, for the
57 Ibid., p.970.
58 Statement by Philip C. Jessup, “U.S. Policy Toward China,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXV, 
No.642 (October 15, 1951), p.606.
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two enemies, who actually fought against each other, to be friends again.59 Since
neither of them was defeated, a peace agreement was not really a peace between
the two countries. The Korean Armistice Agreement (1953) was not a final
solution to Sino-American hostility. Rather, relations between the two countries
were deeply poisoned by the war. Dean Rusk, the assistant secretary of Far
Eastern Affairs said on May 28, 1951:
We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The 
Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government -- a Slavic Manchukuo on 
a large scale. It is not the Government o f China. ... It is not Chinese. ... We 
recognized the National Government o f the Republic o f China [Taiwan], even 
though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more 
authentically represents the view o f the great body o f the people o f China, 
particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control.60
The Korean War strengthened American officials’ belief that Beijing was under 
Moscow’s control. John Foster Dulles, who in 1953 became the Secretary of 
State in Eisenhower’s administration, likened the Beijing government to the 
Wang Ching-wei regime in China during the Second World War. He argued that 
although the Wang regime had been “exercising de facto  authority over most of 
the people of China,” the United States government believed that it was “the tool 
of Japanese imperialism” and refused to recognize it. Similarly, Dulles argued, 
the United States government would not recognize Mao Tse-tung’s regime in 
Beijing because it was the tool of Russian imperialism.61
59 The main counter-argument would be America’s relationship with Germany and Japan after the war.
60 Statement by Dean Rusk, “Chinese-American Friendship,” Department o f State Bulletin. Vol.XXIV,
No.612 (May 28, 1951), p.847.
61 Statement by John Foster Dulles, Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, No.598 (December 18, 1950), 
p.992.
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Because China and America were fighting each other in the Korean War, 
there was no hope for accommodation within a short period of time. The war 
strengthened America’s belief that Beijing was a puppet of Moscow and that the 
United States should not recognize the PRC. The war also strengthened the 
power of the China Lobby, the China Bloc, and McCarthyism in the United 
States. Thus, even after the war, under Eisenhower’s administration, the United 
States government still refused to recognize China and did not allow it to enter 
the United Nations.
In short, the strong China myth distorted Americans’ vision about the 
radical changes in China and gave domestic forces such as the China Lobby, the 
China Bloc, and Senator McCarthy a chance to gain key influence over United 
States foreign policy. If these domestic political pressures discouraged the 
Truman administration from traveling the road of accommodation, the seizure of 
American property in Beijing and the outbreak of the Korean War swept away the 
road and confirmed the Non-Recognition policy as the primary direction of 
American China policy for the next twenty years.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this essay has been to show how the China myth 
influenced America’s perception about the rise of Communist China, and how the 
myth aided the rise of McCarthyism and ensured the success of the China Lobby 
and the China Bloc in the United States. I have argued that foreign policy is not 
merely a reaction to external challenges but also an extension of American 
ideology and culture. Domestic political pressures, which shaped by public 
perception toward China, worked hand in hand with external challenges in 
affecting President Truman’s China policy during an era of uncontrollable 
changes. It kept the administration away from any kind of accommodation and 
prevented the government from recognizing the new Communist regime in China.
Although Truman’s administration tried very hard to find the best possible 
way to deal with this new regime, there were too many factors to be balanced 
effectively. Even though President Truman and Secretary Acheson themselves 
were strongly anti-Communist, they perceived a need to deal with the new China 
practically. Therefore, from November 1949 to January 1950, they struggled to 
find ways of creating some kind of accommodation with the PRC. The response, 
however, was negative. The Ward incident and the seizure of American property 
aroused public discontent. The administration reacted to this challenge 
emotionally by withdrawing all American officials from China. The China 
Lobby, the China Bloc, and Senator McCarthy’s charges kept the administration’s
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attention away from the policy of accommodation. The outbreak of Korean War 
in June 1950 further worsened the situation and ultimately, swept away any hope 
of accommodation when the two countries became engaged on the battlefield. 
From that point onward, the administration stuck to the Non-Recognition policy 
and blocked the PRC entrance into the United Nations.
The Non-Recognition policy demonstrated the way Americans looked at 
themselves and the way they looked at others. In fact, recognition has long been 
used by Washington as a tool for protecting American interests. American 
experiences during the Revolution and the Civil War, as well as their relations 
with the Caribbean gave Americans strong faith in the policy of using recognition 
as a diplomatic tool. In facing the issue of whether to recognize the Communist 
regime in China, Washington policy-makers believed that attaching conditions to 
recognition was the best possible way to pressure the Communists to yield to 
American demands because they assumed that the Chinese needed American 
economic support. Washington also believed that without American recognition 
the Communist regime in Beijing would not last long. Since America was the 
leader of the free world, it should uphold the “united front” in not recognizing the 
Communists. This belief prevented Ambassador Stuart’s visit to Beijing in July 
1949. Because the Beijing government refused to honor western diplomatic 
practice and disregarded all the treaties signed by the previous Chinese
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government with the West, America would not recognize the PRC and prevented 
it from entering the United Nations.
Emotionally speaking, Americans could not understand why China was 
lost to Communism. They tried to explain it by the theory of Soviet expansion. 
They continued to indulge in their myth of a special relationship with the Chinese 
and kept on waiting for the Chinese to return by rebelling against the Soviet 
Union. Because of the China myth, Americans believed the claims of the China 
Lobby and McCarthy and were willing to protect and support the corrupt 
Nationalist regime in Taiwan. Believing itself the leader of the free world with 
an obligation to contain the spread of Communism, America was willing to send 
its boys to Korea and later to Vietnam. It was not a matter of right or wrong 
decision, but a matter of making a choice. Americans made their own choice 
based on their own ideology, myth, and culture. Therefore, if  we want to 
understand American foreign policy, we have to understand the American people 
first. Within a democratic system, it is the American people who influence the 
making American foreign policy.
Looking at Sino-American relations from 1949 to 1953 helps to explain 
how Americans and their government reacted to external changes and how 
external challenges affected the domestic political environment. Policy makers, 
on the one hand, bore distinctive American cultural and ideological baggage, but 
they needed to be pragmatic in facing foreign relations problems. It was this 
dilemma that President Truman and Secretary Acheson had to face when they
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dealt with China. If Truman and Acheson had had the power to foresee what 
would happen in the next twenty years, they might have been able to overrule the 
domestic pressures and wake up from the myth they enjoyed, but most 
importantly, they might have determined to pursue the policy of accommodation 
and recognized the Communist regime in China.
Interestingly, historians have come to realize the importance of cultural 
and ideological factors in analyzing American foreign relations, rather than 
simply looking at political, economic, and strategic factors. The period of Sino- 
American hostility following the Chinese Civil War tells us that in order to find 
the best possible policy for dealing with a foreign country, the decision-makers 
not only need to consider political, economic, and strategic factors, but also need 
to understand the culture and ideology of their own and opposing countries. This 
is the best way to minimize misperception and misunderstanding. The period of 
hostility following the Chinese Civil War was indeed a good history lesson for 
today’s policy makers to learn how to deal with today’s Communist China. When 
the two countries are now arguing over the issues, such as intellectual property 
rights, prison labor, child abuse, and personal liberties, American officials should 
keep in mind cultural and ideological differences and should try to understand 
and accept these differences rather than speaking with deaf ears.
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